N the remote horizon of the present age, hidden from the scenes that now are by the far-off smoke clouds of the civil war in America and the similar darkness of the Franco-Prussian con­flict in Europe, lies the drama of the Crimean War. The ante­cedents of that struggle were as peculiar as those of any other contention among the nations of modern times. The causes of the war were so complicated and reached so far as to involve, sooner or later, the larger part of modern history. The disputes, indeed, out of which the Crimean War followed as a result reached down into the religious condi­tions of Europe and along the lines of those conditions backward to the age of Constantine, if not to the age of Augustus. The so-called Eastern Ques­tion has so many aspects that a biographical history extending through the period cannot be expected to set them forth with anything like completeness. The principal parties to the controversy were Great Britain, France, Turkey, and Russia; but all the powers of Europe were more or less con­cerned. As to Great Britain, she had adopted the policy of upholding the status in quo in Europe. She had her own motives, not a few, for wishing that the Ottoman power, though an Islamite dominion, should hold its own as a kind of barrier against the growing ambitions of Russia. Commercial reasons and political reasons alike prevailed with her to desire the indirect control of the eastern outlets of the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. This involved the desire on the part of Great Britain that the power of Russia should not be established and confirmed on the Black Sea; for that would involve an early forcing of the way by that power through the straits and into the Mediterranean. As to religious prejudices, Great Britain does not allow these to stand in the wind of her commercial interests and politi­cal ambitions; albeit she makes great capital before the world of her claim to be the defender of the Protestant faith.

As to Turkey, that power was in its decadence. She had in her prov­inces, notably in Greece, a large population of professing Christians. Between these and the prevailing Moslemite dominion there was no accord of sympathy and but little common interest. The Christians in Turkey belonged for the most part to the Eastern Church, so that Russia might claim to be their champion and protector. These conditions were highly favorable to edge on the rising conflict.

As to France, though the "empire was peace," according to the dec­laration of the new emperor, he himself needed participation, and if possible leadership, in the coming war. He needed it in order to manifest his

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strength and capacities. He needed it in order to confirm his throne. He needed it as one of those dazzling circumstances in which the French nation so much delights. He needed it to show that he was a true Napoleon. He had obtained recognition from all the crowned heads of Europe, with the exception of Czar Nicholas. That potentate had deigned to designate Napoleon as cousin, but not as brother—a circumstance that rankled more, we doubt not, in the breast of the empress than in the heart of Napoleon. So the emperor set about to make an alliance with England. Great Britain, having declared that she would never assent, assented; and with the growth of the war portent in the East Napoleon III found himself side by side with Victoria and the sultan. Though royal enough, it was one of the most motley teams that ever went to war!

The particular grievance that led to the rupture was the dispute between the Latin and Greek Churches over the claim to precedence in the guardian­ship of the holy places in Palestine. The age will come when the absurdity of such a contention will strike the reader as verging closely to the impos­sible. But as late as the middle of our century such questions were still very real, and in their decision the great nations of Europe drew the sword.

By his elevation to the imperial throne Napoleon HI became the politi­cal head of the Roman Catholic, or Latin, Church in Europe. By like rela­tion Czar Nicholas was the head of the Greek Catholic, or Eastern, Church. Any dispute between the two great divisions of Christendom would place the French emperor and Russian czar in diametrical antagonism.

The arrangements made in Palestine between the Christians and the Mussulmans conceded to the former the possession of certain holy places; but the Christians disputed among themselves as to which faction should be the guardians par excellence. There was a church in Bethlehem, and through this the Latin monks must pass to reach the Sacred Grotto. There was a principal door to the church and a door to the manger, and these doors were locked. Should a Latin monk carry the key, or should a Greek priest have it? Should the Latin monks have the right to place in the sanctuary of the nativity a silver star bearing the arms of France, or should those Western symbols be excluded? The French minister at Constantinople, in Decem­ber of 1852, secured from the sultan permission to place the Silver Star in the sanctuary of Bethlehem, and to have the keys of both church and manger. This concession was resented by the Russian ambassador, and the czar declared that the change contemplated in the management of the holy places was unjust and would be resisted. The thing conceded by Islam to Rome was hateful to the Greek cross.

Meanwhile the czar had in a conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour declared that "we [meaning England and Russia] have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man ; it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he

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should slip away from us before the necessary arrangements have been made." The "necessary arrangements" to which Nicholas referred hinted at what England and Russia ought to do in a friendly way on the occasion of the funeral! It was thus that Turkey, in the parlance of the day, and even to the present, came by the czar's wit to be called the Sick Man of the East.

But the overtures of Nicholas to Great Britain were not acceptable; the alliance of France was chosen instead, and the czar sent an army corps into the Danubian provinces as a precautionary measure, demanding at the same time of Austria that the Turkish troops should be required to withdraw from Montenegro. At this juncture it was believed that both Austria and Prussia would join the alliance in support of Turkey against the aggressions of Nicholas. But the central German powers decided to remain neutral, at the

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same time declaring against the policy of the czar. The alliance contented itself with receiving Sardinia as a member of the league. This made the combination fourfold—English, French, Sardinian, Turkish—against Russia, single and alone. There were futile efforts at negotiation, but these came to naught, and the Eastern Question was left to the arbitrament of the sword. The precise reason for going to war was differently stated by the dif­ferent parties to it. Some said that it was to maintain the traditional policy of upholding the Ottoman Empire, to which England in particular had sub­scribed. Albert, the prince consort, said in a semiofficial way that Great Britain went to war with Russia because that power menaced the Otto­man Empire, and at the same time sought to convert the various prov­inces on the Black Sea into Russian dependencies. This, the prince claimed, would be in violation of that system of balance of power to which all Europe was agreed. Mr. Gladstone held this view, namely, that the public law of Europe was defied and violated by the course of the czar, and that such violation must be punished, not so much by England alone as by the united powers of Europe.

As for France, that nation went to war for religious sentiment and human glory. It is inconceivable that the claim of the Greek Church to pos­sess and control certain places in and about Jerusalem should provoke a great people to the pitch of war. That, however, was assigned as the reason—a reason that did not greatly prevail in England. Lord John Russell declared in a public paper, in January of 1853, that the Church quarrel was in the bot­tom of the difficulty; but Lord John contended that so far as this quarrel extended Russia was in the right / So there was a period of negotiation. Prince Menshikoff demanded of the Sublime Porte a guarantee that the Greek Church should not be impeded in the exercise of her prerogatives about the holy places. This demand the sultan would not grant, where­upon the Russian ambassador went away and the czar sent an ultimatum.

It was in the beginning of July that a Russian army, crossing the Pruth, entered Moldavia and Wallachia. The czar issued a proclamation justify­ing his course as necessary to secure from the porte a recognition and guarantee of Russian rights. He disclaimed the intention of going to war. For several months Great Britain sought in a desultory way to prevent the conflict; but on the 4th of October, 1853, Turkey declared war against Russia. The news produced great excitement throughout England. There were many public meetings. The English nation demanded to know the attitude of the government. Just at this juncture, namely, on the 12th of October, Mr. Gladstone was invited to Manchester to deliver an address on the occasion of the dedication of a statue to the memory of Sir Robert Peel. He must, in the nature of the case, at least refer to the subject that was uppermost in all minds.

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In doing so the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke of the ambitions and aggressions of Russia, which threatened to break the peace of the whole world. In the nature of the case the czar's policy must first strike and undo the Ottoman Empire. It was best to resist Russia at the start. Great Britain would set herself to uphold Turkey as a bulwark against Slavic ambition. Great Britain did not desire war, and for that reason was willing to negotiate. War was a horror not to be rashly provoked. Negotiation might result in nothing. “Negotiation," said the speaker, " is beset with delay, intrigue, and chicane ; but these are not so horrible as war, if negotia­tion can be made to result in saving this country from a calamity which deprives the nation of subsistence and arrests the operations of industry. To attain that result if possible—still to attain it, if still possible, which is even yet their hope—her majesty's ministers have persevered in exercising that self-command and that self-restraint which impatience may mistake for indifference, feebleness, or cowardice, but which are truly the crowning great­ness of a great people, and which do not evince the want of readiness to vindicate, when the time comes, the honor of this country."

In this expression the reader may discover the cautious spirit of Glad­stone, resolute enough to undertake even war, but always disposed to con­sider well before saying, and to say in such terms and phrases as to signify much, but heat little. The temper of the British nation at this very time was highly offended at the policy of Russia, and the public voice was crying out for decisive action and war.

Great Britain in going to war with Russia put herself into a remark­able relation. Czar Nicholas was not unpopular in Western Europe—unless in France. He had married the Princess Charlotte of Prussia, eldest daugh­ter of Frederick William III. Nicholas was a temperate and frugal auto­crat, working from fourteen to sixteen hours daily. He was a Christian czar, and in this respect was at least as near to the sympathies of Great Britain as was Napoleon III. Moreover, in going to war with Russia, Eng­land had to ally herself with the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, of whom it might be said there was nothing in him to be desired. His government was one of the most corrupt and wicked imaginable. He was at the head of the Mus­sulman faith, and was the front of that offending in both Europe and Asia. The existence of such a power and such a ruler in Europe required—as it has ever since required—both apology and explanation. That Great Britain could be in alliance with a creature such as the porte seemed incred­ible enough; but the Eastern Question required just such bedfellows. Eng­land was in the attitude of supporting the cause of a thing without support­ing the thing of the cause!

For a while, however, there was no further declaration of war than that of Turkey. It was a little more than a year, namely, on the 1st of Novem-

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ber, 1853, that Nicholas answered with a manifesto the challenge of the porte. He declared in a paper to his people that the blindness and the obstinacy of the Ottoman Empire obliged him to take up arms. Just after­ward a paper called "The Vienna Note" was prepared by the powers and sent to both Russia and Turkey as a proposed basis of settlement. It was accepted by the former country, but rejected by the latter. Hereupon another note was prepared, which in its turn was rejected by the czar. This furnished the final offense, and on the 28th of March, 1854, England declared war. Matters had gone so far and the public mind was so greatly inflamed that only a few voices were lifted against the declaration.

Already the allied fleets had entered the Black Sea. On that water had occurred, on the 30th of November previously, the battle of Sinope between the Turks and the Russians. A Russian fleet hovering about Sinope provoked the Turks, who sailed out to the trial and were over­whelmed. Their squadron was annihilated. About four thousand of the Turks were reduced by slaughter to as many hundreds, and it was said that not a single Ottoman of those engaged escaped without a wound. The Russians after their victory on the water proceeded to bombard and destroy Sinope. The news of this fight was carried to Western Europe, and pro­duced a fever of excitement. The reports of the conflict were exaggerated by the correspondents and messengers into the phrase “Massacre of Sinope," by which the battle was ever afterward designated.

It cannot be denied that at this juncture Napoleon III made a praise­worthy effort to verify his motto, “the empire is peace." On the 29th of January, 1854, he wrote a dignified and conciliatory letter to Czar Nicholas, as follows: " Your majesty has given so many proofs of your solicitude for the tranquility of Europe, and by your beneficent influence has so power­fully arrested the spirit of disorder, that I cannot doubt as to the course you will take in the alternative which presents itself to your choice. Should your majesty be as desirous as myself of a pacific conclusion, what would be simpler than to declare that an armistice shall now be signed, that all hostilities shall cease, and that the belligerent forces shall retire from the places to which motives of war have led them? Thus the Russian troops would abandon the principalities, and our squadrons the Black Sea. Your majesty, preferring to treat directly with Turkey, might appoint an ambassa­dor who could negotiate with the plenipotentiary of the sultan a convention which might be submitted to a conference of the four powers. Let your majesty adopt this plan, upon which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly agreed, and tranquility will be reestablished and the world satis­fied. There is nothing in the plan which is unworthy of your majesty, nothing which can wound your honor; but if, from motives difficult to under­stand, your majesty should refuse this proposal, then France as well as

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England will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms and the chance of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice."

To this the czar replied ten days afterward that he had done as much for the maintenance of peace as was compatible with his honor ; that he was the guardian of the Greek Christians in Turkey ; that the porte had been overborne by evil influences; that his confidence was in God and the right. Then he added, “Russia, as I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812." The response, as a whole, was not calculated to mend matters in the least, and the phrase about 1812 was manifestly a defi, if not an insult. The French so regarded it, and the war craze in France became as feverish as it was already in Great Britain. The French ambassador at St. Petersburg left that capital and sent to his master this dispatch: “I return with refusal."

In England the Aberdeen ministry was loath in the extreme to go to war. Lord Aberdeen was himself of a conservative and peaceable disposi­tion. He was in sympathy with the Peace Society of the kingdom. That society sent a committee to St. Petersburg, in the hope of stemming the tide and preventing hostilities. Mr. Gladstone was almost as anxious as was the premier to avoid war. He, too, was by nature strongly inclined to peace. As chancellor of the exchequer and a man of business by the whole course of his life, he must needs contemplate with aversion the horrible expenditure as well as the havoc of war. He saw in such an event a great increase in the burdens which must be borne by the people of Great Britain. He saw the probable ruin of the financial scheme which he had proposed two years before, and which had been adopted as the policy of the kingdom. That scheme was intended for peace. Or, if it looked to war at all, it merely provided for the remote contingency of it. Kinglake, the historian of the Crimean war, has fully described the Gladstonian sentiment and character at this time :

"If he [Gladstone] was famous for the splendor of his eloquence, for his unaffected piety, and for his blameless life, he was celebrated far and wide for a more than common liveliness of conscience. He had once imagined it to be his duty to quit a government and to burst through strong ties of friendship and gratitude by reason of a thin shade of difference on the subject of white or brown sugar. It was believed that if he were to commit even a little sin, or to imagine an evil thought, he would instantly arraign himself before the dread tribunal which awaited him within his own bosom; and that, his intellect being subtle and microscopic, and delighting in casuistry and exaggeration, he would be likely to give his soul a very harsh trial and treat himself as a great criminal for faults too minute to be visible to the naked eyes of laymen. His friends lived in dread of his virtues as tending to make him whimsical and unstable, and

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the practical politicians, perceiving that he was not to be depended upon for party purposes, and was bent upon none but lofty objects, used to look upon him as dangerous—used to call him behind his back a good man, a good man in the worst sense of the term."

In any event, it remained for Gladstone to provide for the financial affairs of Great Britain at the outbreak of the Crimean War and during a considerable section of that conflict. His duties were onerous. The statesman and financier justified himself in supporting the government, in defending the war, in doing his best to furnish the means requisite for

its prosecution, on the ground that it was a defensive war, undertaken by Eng­land in the interest of universal peace, against the aggressions of Russia. How­ever much he may have deplored the fact of war, he nevertheless accepted it as necessary to the honor of his country. The principal events in the progress of that struggle may here be briefly summarized :

The allied powers sent with all expedition an army of sixty-five thousand men, with five thousand horse and eighty pieces of artillery, to the Black Sea. The expedition reached its destination on the 14th of September, 1854. In a short time the allies—English, French, Turks—concentrated at Varna, from which place a descent on the Russians in the Crimean peninsula was contemplated. Already the Turks in Europe had made considerable headway against the enemy. It was at this juncture that Omar Pasha appeared as the leader and hero of the Ottoman forces.

The Russians were under command of Prince Menshikoff, the English under Lord Raglan, and the French under Marshal Pelissier. On the 20th of September, 1854, a bloody battle was fought on the river Alma. Here the Russians were defeated, and were compelled to fall back in the direction of their strong fortress, Sebastopol, at the southeastern extremity of the peninsula. Here the war was focused. The Russians were strongly rein­forced late in the autumn, and Menshikoff united his divisions behind the works of Sebastopol. On the 25th of September the heights of Balaklava, south of the Russian position, were seized by the British under Lord Raglan, and on the 9th of October the siege of Sebastopol was begun.

For nearly eleven months the allies held that strong fortress in their grip. They succeeded before winter in bringing their batteries to bear on

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the town ; but the Russians for their part succeeded in blockading with sunken vessels and other obstructions the entrance to the harbor. The siege that ensued was one of the most remarkable in history. The Russians made two tremendous sallies, the first on the night of the 25th of October, at Balaklava. This place was held by a combined force of Turks and English. The former gave way from four redoubts, which were carried by the assailants; but at the crisis of the battle the British Highlanders came

into action, and the Russians were driven back. It was here that the charge of the Light Brigade occurred, memorable in song and story.

The other sortie of the Russians was against the village of Inkerman, at the head of the harbor. This occurred on the 5th of November, 1854. A strong force of Russians descended from the high grounds which they occupied, and were confronted by the allies on the slope opposite, near the ruins of an ancient town mentioned by Strabo. Here the Russian attack fell with great violence on the English and French; but the latter were

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victorious. Many like movements of a minor character occurred in the beginning of winter, and then the rigor of the season fell on the combatants. In the month of January came such cruel privations and sufferings as have rarely been borne by soldiers in modern times. Hunger, disease, and cold did their worst on the allied camps. The genius of Elizabeth Butler has seized upon the morning "Roll Call" in the Crimean snows to depict the excess of human suffering and devotion to duty.

Before the winter was passed the allied lines around Sebastopol were considerably contracted. On the 23d of February the French assailed with great valor the stronghold called the Malakhoff, but were repulsed. On the 18th of the following June, being the fortieth anniversary of Waterloo, the assault was desperately renewed, but without success. On the 16th of August was fought the bloody battle of Tchernaya, being the last effort of the Russians to raise the siege. With a force of fifty-six thousand men they threw themselves against the allied position, but could not break through.

All the while the trenches of the allies were drawn nearer and nearer to the Russian defenses. On the 5th of September a terrible cannonade was opened, and when this had lasted three days both English and French sprang from their intrenchments and carried, the one the Redan and the other the Malakhoff, by storm. The losses of the combatants were immense. The Russians blew up their fortifications on the south side of the harbor and retreated across the bay. The victors destroyed the docks, arsenals, and shipyards of Sebastopol, going as far as they could toward making impossible the future occupancy of the place by the Russians as a seat of commerce and war.

By this great success of the allies a permanent check was given to the ambition of Czar Nicholas. The Russian empire was reined back on its haunches by the hands of France and England out of the West. On the 2d of March, 1855, the czar died, as was believed, of disappointment and a broken heart. The allies went on to capture Kertch, at the entrance to the Sea of Azov, which they effected on the 25th of May. Soon after­ward hostilities ceased and the epoch of negotiation followed. Commis­sioners met at Paris, and on the 30th of March, 1856, a treaty was concluded, called the Treaty of Paris, to which Russia was obliged to give her reluctant consent.

The greater part of these events were accomplished, so far as England was concerned, under the auspices of the Aberdeen ministry. However reluctantly that government had gone into the war it nevertheless rallied in the English manner to prosecute the conflict to a successful termination. There was in the kingdom a remaining sentiment against the war, and ever favorable to its cessation. It is in evidence that the chancellor of the

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exchequer was hard pressed in his feelings between the conflict of duty and sentiment. To him remained the painful part of abandoning the tax scheme which he had prepared with so much care on entering upon his office and of preparing another to meet the exigencies of war. He was obliged to extend his rates to incomes and spirits and malt. He was also obliged to consume the more than million pounds of surplus which he had provided. It had been his intention to grant release from taxation, and instead of this he must greatly increase it. This would necessarily be

followed with popular discontent and complainings. He had expected to remit the duty on sugar; but this pleasing measure had to be abandoned.

At this juncture Gladstone and Disraeli were again brought into con­flict. The former conceived the plan of providing the extraordinary expenses of the war from the current revenues of the kingdom. He thought this might be done by increasing the tax rates so as to secure ten millions sterling above the usual expenditure. This he boldly proposed. The measure was approved by Prince Albert, and the people at large responded favorably to the plan. In opposition to this Mr. Disraeli pro­posed to borrow, and to increase the national debt by as much as might be required.

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The issue was sharply drawn. The public opinion was so strongly with the chancellor that he went forward to propose on the plan indicated his war budget of 1854. He was able to report a surplus of more than a million pounds from the previous year. In addition to this he could show that the expenditures were by more than another million less than had been estimated. This gave the chancellor over two million pounds to begin with. He accordingly, on the 6th of March, 1854, brought forward the budget, in which he proposed a vote of a million and a quarter pounds for the extraordinary military expenditures of the year. He strongly defended the policy of paying as fast as expenditure was necessary. He opposed with all his might the increase of the national debt, holding that future generations should not be mortgaged to the present. It was the present that made war in the interest of England and of civilization; let the present, therefore, demonstrate its patriotism by paying as it went the nec­essary expense of the conflict. Nor may we pass from this episode in the career of Gladstone without emphasizing it as the most important feature of all the financial policies that he ever proposed.

The theory of making the war period pay its own way is one of universal application. No nation is ready to engage in war or ought to engage in it, except in extreme cases, unless it is ready also to pay. The Gladstonian policy dominated the financial management of Great Britain during the Crimean War, and to that circumstance the kingdom was indebted for the inconsiderable increase in the national indebtedness on the score of the expensive and distressing contest which she was obliged to wage with a powerful enemy in Asia.

Gladstone had to face a deficit for the current year (1853-54) of nearly three million pounds—this in addition to the surplus which had accumulated. To meet this large demand and to provide for the ensuing year he placed himself stubbornly on the ground of raising the revenue by a sum equivalent to that demanded, and to do it within the year. He would not resort to a loan. He boldly declared that England, more than any other country, had resorted to the dangerous expedient of laying mortgages on the industries and enterprises of future generations. He declared with equal boldness that a nation ready to go to war ought to be ready to make the sacrifices necessary to support it. He held that this policy, if rigorously adhered to, would bridle the spirit of war and reduce that monster's devastations to a minimum. He called attention of Parliament to the fact that England had entered on the great struggle under favorable circumstances. He praised the House for the noble efforts already made in support of the treasury. He called attention to the fact that the military establishment had been increased by forty thousand men, and urged this circumstance as a proof that the government

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was prosecuting the war against Russia with decision in council and vigor in the field.

The sentiment of Europe—all Europe—was, said the speaker, with England in this emergency. Everything seemed to indicate a prosperous conclusion of the war at an early date. It was the duty of the House of Commons to adhere strictly to the rule of making each year raise its own supplies. Finally the chancellor laid before Parliament his actual estimates for 1854-55 placing the income at a little more and the expenditure at a little less than fifty-six and a half million pounds. To all this he added a recommendation relative to the equal taxation of domestic and foreign bills of exchange.

The discussions which followed the presentation of the budget were nearly all favorable thereto. It was noted that Mr. Disraeli's opposition at the outset on the motion to consider, and his proposal to borrow funds and increase the national debt, had been made pro forma rather than with inten­tion seriously to obstruct the ministry. That statesman, after Gladstone had concluded, addressed the House, stating that her majesty's opposition was bound, notwithstanding any divergence of views from those upon which the budget was founded, to support the measure as a whole, since it was necessary to prosecute the war. He entered a protest, however, that in case the war should be long continued it could not be conceded that the requisite supplies should be raised year by year by taxation. So on the 20th of March, 1854, the budget came to a vote and was carried without a division of the House. This included the proposition to double the income tax for the ensuing year.

Hereupon Lord Willoughby offered an amendment suspending the increased rate for the first half of the year following. The debate broke out anew, and Disraeli made a spirited and effective speech, marked with his usual wit, sarcasm, and casuistry. He concluded with the assertion that the ministry was not a unit, and had not been a unit, either in declaring the war or in prosecuting it. The ministry was rightly designated as a coalition ministry, and the war was therefore a coalition war! This spirited sally, however, did not avail. Gladstone replied with great vigor and success. He challenged the opposition to propose a vote of want of confidence. The sentiment of the House was so strongly with the chancellor that the Wil­loughby amendment was rejected by a large majority, and on the 30th of March the bill as a whole was passed.

This highly successful and radical expedient of the Chancellor of the Exchequer met the expectation of its projector, but the enlarging proportions of the war soon demanded additional outlays. Already before the adoption of the budget an army of twenty-five thousand men had been sent forward by the Duke of Newcastle to the Crimea, and this was followed by other

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divisions to the same field. The war was undertaken in dead earnest. Mr. Gladstone on the 8th of May found himself under necessity of presenting a supplemental budget, wherein he proposed to raise an addition of nearly seven million pounds to meet the extraordinary expenses of the war. He went at the question boldly, but with .his usual circumspection and prudence. He declared himself unwilling to increase the income taxes further, and also unwilling to alter the postal system with a view to increas­ing revenue. It had become necessary, so the speaker urged, to lay duties on articles of consumption and manufacture.

The articles on which he would recommend additional taxation were spirits, sugar, and malt. He proposed as the principal item in the increase a duty of four shillings the bushel on malt. He estimated the consumption of that commodity at forty million bushels, which under his proposal would yield nearly two and a half millions. He would increase the duties on Scotch and Irish spirits, in the former country by one shilling and in the latter by eight pence the gallon. From this source he would derive four hundred and fifty thousand pounds. From the increase of the sugar duties he thought that seven hundred thousand pounds might be derived. He urged that there should be no delay in granting the additional levies. The fact of his asking for them could not be adduced as evidence of a want of foresight relative to the expenses of the war. He defended his propositions each and several, and stood strongly to his position against borrowing and increasing the national debt. He quoted from Pitt the warning which that statesman had uttered on the score of national loans. If Great Britain would stand stoutly to the principle of making the annual revenues equal to the expenditures, then the vigor of the English race in commerce, manufac­tures, and productive industries would be sufficient to meet even the enor­mous outlays of a war in Asia.

The event showed that Parliament was not expecting so bold and withal so radical a measure of financial policy. The debates were spirited. There was an effort to defer the second reading of the bill. Several distinguished parliamentarians strongly opposed the chancellor's measures. The cautious Disraeli, affirming all the while that he was in favor of a vig­orous prosecution of the war, nevertheless opposed the tax on malt as a thing ruinous to one of the leading industries of Great Britain. It was a measure, said he, directed against agriculture, and could not be borne. Nev­ertheless the House supported the proposition of the chancellor by a majority of more than a hundred votes.

After this the principal debate of the session was on a proposition to make a temporary loan of six million pounds. It was necessary for the gov­ernment to have an abundance of ready funds in advance of the revenues which had just been provided. It was already in July before this question

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came to a vote in the House. There was much acrimonious discussion, in which Disraeli participated with his wonted brilliancy of attack. Lord John Russell strongly supported the government, but the principal defense of the ministerial policy was left to Gladstone himself. In a perfectly equable temper he took up the charges against the management of the war and the objections against the war itself, and showed the falsity of the one and the hollowness of the other. The event demonstrated the strong hold which the chancellor of a coalition ministry might have on the nation at large. Again his policy was approved by a majority of more than a hundred, and on the 12th of August, 1854, Parliament was prorogued.