PART II. Chapter VII.

THE fortifications around Washington, commenced by Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer under McDowell, and continued by the same officer under McClellan, had been essentially completed before the close of September, 1861. In an order issued on the 30th of that month, the commanding General designated the names by which the thirty-two principal works should be respectively known. From this time onward a large portion of the Army of the Potomae was no longer needed on merely defensive duty. In a communication addressed to the Secretary of War in the latter part of October, Gen. McClellan estimated the number of troops required for the protection of Washington at 35,000, with a further force of 23,000, to be distributed on the Upper and Lower Potomae, and at Baltimore and Annapolis. The main purpose of this vast army, raised, equipped and disciplined at such a cost, was manifestly something quite beyond what 58,000 men alone amply sufficed to accomplish. To destroy the Rebel army before Washington, and to occupy Richmond, were, in the minds alike of military men and civilians, the prime objects to be effected by the Army of the Potomae.

October, November, December, passed without result. The commanding General admits his consciousness of the anxiety no less of the people than of the President for active operations during these pleasant months, on the part of an army sustained at a cost of millions daily. Gen. McClellan's official statement gives his entire force on the 1st of December as 198,213, of whom 169,452 were present for duty, and on the first of January, 1862, as 219,707, of whom 191,480 were " effective." After deducting the 58,000 deemed necessary for defensive purposes—and most of these might also have been employed in a direct movement on Manassas—there thus remained an effective

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army of 111,452 at the former date, and of 133,480 at the latter for an aggressive movement. Beauregard, who had his headquarters at Centreville, until he was transferred to another command, on the 30th of January, certainly had at no time a force in McClellan's front exceeding one-half the number of the Army of the Potomac.

Gen. McClellan records no surprising fact, therefore, when he states that "about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness," he "found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Poto-"mac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration."

More than six months having elapsed since the command of this army had devolved upon Gen. McClellan, without the development of either a particular plan or a general purpose of attacking the enemy, under circumstances the most favorable, and an unexpected quiescence having followed his appointment as General-in-chief, the President at length issued his " General "War Order, No. 1," as follows :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, } January 27,

1862.}

President's General War Order, No. 1.]

ORDERED, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

That especially the Army at and about Portress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the Army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the Army and Flotilla at Cairo, and a Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. That the Heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN. This mandate, communicated to high officers immediately

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concerned, was not made public until the 11th of March following. In it, the President fully resumed his constitutional position as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, practically dispensing with the services of Gen. McClellan as a " Lieutenant," in the discharge of those high duties, as was more formally announced at a later day, on the publication of this general order.

After thus directing Gen. McClellan's efforts more particularly to the management of the Army of the Potomac, the President soon found it expedient to concentrate that officer's thoughts upon some definite plan—which had evidently been not very clearly before his mind hitherto—for rendering this great force of practical service to the Government. Consequently, four days later, the following order was communicated to McClellan :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,}

January 31, 1862.

ORDERED, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction ; all details to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before, or on, the twenty-second day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Immediately after receiving this order, Gen. McClellan prepared a long letter to Mr. Stanton, (dated January 31, 1862,) in which he set forth his objections to this movement, and vehemently urged the substitution of a plan of advance upon Richmond by the Lower Rappahannock, with Urbana as a base. He insists that a movement by Manassas must be delayed on account of the bad condition of the roads, and that this difficulty would be removed by taking the route he proposes, over a more sandy soil, and in a latitude in which the season is two or three weeks earlier. " This movement, if adopted," he says, "will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new Jine would be (according to circumstances) from 110,000 to

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140 000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe." The maximum number here stated would still leave more than 60,000 for the defense of Washington, without additional "fresh troops." Gen. McClellan closes this letter with the following earnest appeal:

In conclusion, I would respectfully but firmly advise that I may be authorized to undertake at once the movement by Urbana. I believe that it can be carried into execution so "nearly simultaneously with the final advance of Buell and Halleck, that the columns will support each other, I will stake my life, my reputation, on the result,—more than that, I will stake upon it the success of our cause. I hope but little from the attack on Manassas. My judgment is against it. Foreign complications may entirely change the state of affairs, and render very different plans necessary. In that event, I will be ready to submit to them.

On the 3d of February, President Lincoln addressed to Gen, McClellan the following memorable letter, having reference to the Urbana plan, scarcely more than alluded to by McClellan in his final report, and seemingly as unceremoniously abandoned, after serving a purpose, as it had been zealously improvised :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

February 3, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac ; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours :

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine ?

2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine ?

3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this; that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications; while mine would ?

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5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine ?

Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN,

MAJ.-GEN. McCLELLAN.

These plain test questions were never directly met. In a long letter of the same date, however, addressed to the Secretary of War, arguing the merits of the two plans, Gen. McClel-lan avers that he " substantially answered " the President's inquiries. The subject remained for some time under consideration, the President's order not withdrawn, but its execution suspended, while McClellan at length proceeded to the work of opening the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, under urgent pressure from his superiors.

On the 26th of February, he announced, from Sandy Hook, that London and Bolivar Heights, and also Maryland Heights, had been occupied by our troops, and that G. W. Smith was expected at Winchester with 15,000 Rebels. After incurring much cost and delay in the construction .of canal boats to be used in crossing the Upper Potomac, he now found, on proceeding to use them, a considerable force intended for Winchester being already under orders, that, as he expressed it in a dispatch to the Secretary of War, Feb. 27th, "the lift-lock" was "too small" to permit the boats to pass up to their destination. Mr. Stanton sent this laconic reply, under the same date : " Gen. McClellan — If the lift-lock is not big enough, why can not it be made big enough ? Please answer immediately." The response was, that, to do this, the entire masonry must be destroyed and rebuilt. Consequently, the boats, long patiently waited for, were summarily dispensed with, and the marching orders countermanded. At the same time, for reasons satisfactory to himself, McClellan revoked an order he had given to Hooker, for a movement toward silencing the Rebel batteries on the Potomac, which had also been earnestly pressed by the Administration. His plan at Harper's Ferry, as stated Feb. 28, was chiefly " to occupy Charlestown and Bunker Hill, so as to cover the rebuilding of the railway," making the following objections to the desired advance upon

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Winchester and thorough occupation of the Shenandoah Valley: " We could not supply and move to Winchester for many days, and had I moved more troops here, they would have been at a loss for food on the Virginia side." McClellan soon after returned to Washington, and began the movement on Manas-sas as required by the President's order of January 31st — a full month having now intervened.

Events in the Valley, for some time to come, may here be briefly summed up. Charlestown was occupied in force by Gen. Banks on the 28th of February, and Martinsburg on the 3d of March. Col. Geary occupied Leeshurg on the 2d. Stone-wall Jackson evacuated Winchester on the 11th, and was pursued by Gen. Shields (who had succeeded the lamented Gen. Lander,) until overtaken near New Market on the 19th, within supporting distance of the Rebel force under Joe Johaston, (who had taken full command, in that quarter, when Beaure- gard left for the West, the last of January.) Shields retreated rapidly to Winchester, on the 20th. On the 22d, by order of Gen. McClellan, the forces of Gen. Banks, now constituting the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomae, were nearly all, with the exception of Shields' division, withdrawn to the vicinity of Manassas. On the same evening, the Rebels, tinder Jackson and Longstreet, supposed to be 10,000 strong, attacked the place, and were gallantly repulsed by Shields, whose division numbered less than 8.000. After this battle, Gen. Banks, having returned to the Valley, followed up the retreating enemy, successively occupying Strasburg, Wooclstoek, and (on the 26th of March) Harrisonburg. The Rebel forces now retired from that region, and the Valley was comparatively quiet for nearly two months following.

On the 28th of February, McClellan returned to Washington. The results at Harper's Ferry, as well as the delay in raising the blockade of the Lower Potomac, had been far from satisfactory to the President. The day fixed for a general movement had passed, and the plan of advancing on Richmond by the Chesapeake, if acquiesced in, was manifestly impracticable, unless by the roundabout way of Annapolis, until the Potomac had first been cleared of the Kebel batteries. Mean-

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while, as early as the 15th of February, measures had been taken by the Secretary of War to secure with promptness the necessary transportation by water for the forces to be moved. This fact indicates the determination of the Administration to acquiesce in a plan on which the Commanding General was ready to stake so much, rather than to insist on a movement much preferred, yet which could hardly be expected to succeed under the reluctant generalship of one who felt no confidence in its success, and who would show no alacrity in its execution.

With all that had been accomplished in the way of organization, discipline, and general preparation, the Army of the Potomac had still remained without distribution into Army Corps. The President, sustained by the best military authorities and advisers, if not by the universal practice in modern warfare, had desired such organization to be made. This Gen. McClellan had failed to attend to, and it was not until he was on the eve of a movement toward Manassas, with a manifest purpose not to perfect his organization, that President Lincoln issued the following peremptory order :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

March 8, 1862.

President's General War Order, No. 2.]

ORDERED, I. That the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that part of said army destined to enter upon active operations, (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the fortifications about Washington,) into four army corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank, as follows :

First Corps, to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by Maj.-Gen. I. McDowell.

Second Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner.

Third Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman.

Fourth Corps, to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes.

II. That the divisions now commanded by the officers above assigned to the command of Corps, shall be embraced in and form part of their respective Corps.

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III. The forces left for the defense of Washington will be placed in command of Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. who shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia.

IV. That this order be executed with such promptness and dispatch, as not to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the Army of the Po- tomac

. V. That the Fifth Army Corps, to be commaded by Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own and Gen. Shields', late Gen. Lander's, division,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

To the execution of this order, the Commanding Genera! interposed such obstacles as were in his power, without positive refusal. On the 9th of March, having taken the field, he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton from Hall's Hill, the headquarters of Fitz John Porter, that " in the arrangements for to-morrow it is impossible to carry " the order " into effect," and asks its suspension. The Secretary promptly replied : " I think it is the duty of every officer to obey the President's orders, nor can I see any reason why you should not obey them in the present instance. I must, therefore, decline to suspend them." McClellan, still at Hall's Hill, telegraphs, on the 10th, that he " must suspend movement, or disregard order," alleging "military necessity," and adds: " If you desire it, I will at once countermand " marching orders. To avoid this alternative, consent was granted for a temporary delay, until the impending movement should have been executed. The same day, McClellan informed the Department that the troops were in motion. Centreville was occupied that evening without opposition, and Manassas on the 11th, the only obstacle to movement being that the "roads are horrible."

Before this movement actually commenced, the President, who had reluctantly yielded his preference for such an advance on Richmond as would at the same time cover the National Capital, and who had not been indifferent to the neglect of his wishes in regard to the opening of the Potomac, or to the delays which experience had led him to dread, issued the subjoined general order:

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EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

ORDERED, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en rcute for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the General-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

ORDERED, That the Army and Navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

L, THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

On the 9th of March, the steamer Merrimac, which had been taken possession of by the insurgents at Norfolk, after the abandonment of that post in the spring of 1861, and converted into a formidable iron-clad vessel, re-named the Virginia, attacked and destroyed the Government sailing frigates Cumberland and Congress. The Minnesota, in coming to their assistance, ran aground. For awhile, all the shipping in the harbor seemed at the mercy of the Rebel monster. But the timely arrival of Ericsson's Monitor, just completed, and hitherto regarded as a doubtful experiment, ended the work of destruction, and caused the Merrimac to retire within shelter at Norfolk. These hurried and startling events caused great sensation at the time, both in this country and abroad, and have had a marked influence in regard to naval armaments every-where.

McClellan having now taken the field, so that a supervision of all the armies of the nation was clearly out of his power.

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the President made public a change that was no secret to the General commanding the Army of the Potomac, through the following order—in which, also, two separate departments were created in the West, to be commanded by Gens. Halleck and Buell, and a third intermediate department, under the command of Gen. Fremont:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

March 11, 1862.

President's War Order, No. 3.J

Maj.-Gen. McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

ORDERED FURTHER, That the two departments now under the respective commands of Gens. Halleek and Hunter, together with so much of that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered Maj.-Gen. Halleck have command of said department.

ORDERED, ALSO, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Maj.-Gen. Fremont.

That all the Commanders of Departments, after the receipt of this order by them respectively, report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War from Fairfax Court House, on the 13th of March, that a council oi the commanders of army corps had " unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations," which Gen. McDowell would lay before him. To this the Secretary, on the same day, replied: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed at once to execute, without losing an hour for any approval."

The plan—which, in answer to a question of Mr. Stanton? Gen. McClellan stated that "the council, together with himself," were unanimous in forming—was given in these words ;

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, March 13, 1862.

A council of the Generals commanding army corps, at the headquarters of the Army of the Potoinac, were of the opinion— I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordon sville, behind the Rappahaunock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the Generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers: Provided,

1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized.

2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and,

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York river.

4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing can not be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them, with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)

NOTE.—That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)

The scheme having been promptly submitted to the President, the following dispatch was immediately returned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862.

The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution :

1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2. Leave Washington entirely secure.

3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any-where between

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here and there, or, at all eveuts, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

Maj.-Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

McClellan replied that this would " be at once carried into effect."

Transportation was rapidly provided, under the direction of the War Department, this work having really commenced as early as the middle of February, and the other preparations for departure, on the part of the force intended for the Peninsula, were soon in readiness. The following statement of the numerical strength of this portion of the Army, on the 1st of April, is taken from the official report of the Adjutant General :

First Corps, under General I. McDowell, - - 38,454

Second " " " E. V. Sumner, - 31,037

Third, " " " S. P. Heintzelman, 38,854

Fourth, " " " E. D. Keyes, - - 37,910

Regular Infantry, ---------- 4,765

Regular Cavalry, -------- - - 3,141

Artillery Reserve, ---------- 3,116

Provost Guards, U. S. Engineer forces, and Headquarters Cavalry escort, ------- 1,144

Total, -------.-- 158,419

From the same authority, it appears that the total force left (according to the intention of Gen. McClellan) under command of Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, now appointed Military Governor of the District of Washington, was 22,410, of whom less than 20,000 were present for duty. How far this number fell short of all McClellan's previous estimates of the necessary force for the defense of the city, need not be suggested to the reader of the preceding pages. Gen. Wadsworth promptly called the attention of the War Department to this striking deficiency. The plan of the Peninsular movement as submitted for Executive approval, the special order of the President consenting to this plan, on condition that the capital should be

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rendered secure, and the letter of Gen. Wadsworth on this subject, were referred to Adj.-Gen. Thomas and Maj.-Gen. E. A. Hitchcock, who were required to report whether the President's order, in this matter, had been carried out. Those officers, after full consideration, reported that the force proposed to be left, in execution of that order, was "entirely inadequate." They further said:

In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of opinion that the requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the General-in-chief, but that of the commanders of all the army corps, also, has not been fully complied with.

Meanwhile, the movement of troops from Alexandria to Fortress Monroe had commenced. Gen. Hamilton's division, of the Third Corps, embarked on the 17th of March, and was followed by Fitz John Porter's division, of the same corps, on the 22d. Other troops followed at intervals, as transports were ready. Gen. MeClellan himself left Alexandria on the 1st of April, and reached Fortress Monroe the next day.

There still remained two army corps which had not yet been transferred to the Peninsula, when the report of Grens. Thomas and Hitchcock was made. The only remedy for McClellan's intended disregard alike of the conditions of his own plan and of the President's requirement, respecting the force to be left at Washington and in its vicinity, was such as the President applied in the first part of the following order, the wisdom of which was soon fully demonstrated:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 3, 1862.

The Secretary of War will order that one or the other of the corps of Gen. McDowell and Gen. Sumner remain in front of Washington until further orders from the Department, to operate at, or in the direction of, Manassas Junction, or otherwise as the occasion may require; that the other corps, not so ordered to remain, go forward to Gen. McClellan as speedily as possible ; that Gen. McClellan commence Ms forward move-

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ments from his new base at once, and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper, be also made.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

On the same day, Gen. McOlellan had telegraphed from Fort ress Monroe: " I expect to move from here tomorrow morning on Yorktown, where a force of some 15,000 of the Rebels are in intrenched position, and I think it quite possible they will attempt to resist us." On the 4th, he said : " Our advance is at Cockestown, within five miles of Yorktown. ... I expect to fight to-morrow, as I shall endeavor to cut the communication between Yorktown and Richmond." At the same time Gen. Wool, telegraphing the departure of these forces for York-town, expressed a decided opinion that no serious resistance would be encountered there. It is probable, from the information since obtained, that when the movement commenced, the Rebel force under Magruder was less than 10,000. It is certain that the intrenchments were by no means so formidable as to justify the loss of time requisite for a siege, not only wasting precious days, but wearing out as many lives in the trenches as would have been sacrificed in carrying the works by assault. Such, at least, appears to have been the opinion of the President, who did not imagine for a moment, when his order above quoted was given, that a purpose to sit down before Yorktown, until the enemy had time to concentrate a strong force there, was entertained by the Commanding General.

Carrying out the policy of his order of April 3d, the President, as indicated by an order issued from the War Department on the following day, created two new military departments, including the spheres of operation and the troops left behind by McClellan on his withdrawal to the Peninsula. The Department of the Shenandoah embraced that portion of Vir-ginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, and was put under the command of Maj.-Gen. Banks. The Department of the Rappahannock comprised that portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge to the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, together with the District of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent. Gen. MeDowell was desig-

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nated to command this department. The movements of the enemy in the valley, and the exposed condition ia which McClellan had been on the point of leaving the National Capital, ia disregard of instructions and of the express conditions on which the movement to the Peninsula was permitted, showed the expediency of having a responsible commander in both these localities. The remoteness of Gen. McClellan, and his occupation with other engrossing duties, seemed further to require this change.

if the President had not expected any serious loss of time at Yorktown, it is equally evident, from official dispatches, that such a thought had found no place in the mind of McClellan until about the same date as his official notification of the action of the Administration, just referred to. His dispatch, urging a reconsideration of this action, was prefaced by representations of the numbers and preparations of the enemy, not very closely agreeing with those previously given, yet at least such as to afford cogent reasons for an unhesitating advance. This significant paper is subjoined:

[Received 8.30 A. M., April 6.]

NEAR YORKTOWN, 7 1/2- P. M., April 5.

A. LINCOLN, President: The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoissance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extend across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being reenforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances, I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy, and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers, but whatever your decision may be I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you can not leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

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To this dispatch the following reply was promptly sent:

WAR DEPARTMENT. WASHINGTON CITY,

April 6, 1862.

Maj-Gen. GEO. B. McCLELLAN: The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. Sum-ner's corps is on the road to you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance toward Manassas. There are no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the Government shalf be done to sustain you as occasion may require. EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War

. Magruder, who commanded the Rebel force near Yorktown, fully appreciated the element of time in this campaign, and undoubtedly maneuvered with some skill to put his adversary on a cautious policy. In general orders to be read to his troops, on the 4th of April, he said : " The enemy is before us—our works are strong—our cause is good—we fight for our homes, and must be careful. Every hour we hold out, brings us reinforcements." Instead of availing himself of his over-whelming superiority of numbers, by a resolute attack, McClel-lan paused to discuss still further the conduct of the Administration as to matters far away from the immediate sphere of his labors, and to beg for reenforcements. On the 6th, he sent the following dispatch, (received in Washington at 3 o'clock P. M.):

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

A. LINCOLN, President: The order forming new Departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives rne of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles. I respectfully request that I may not be placed in this position, but that my orders for wagon trains, ammunition, and other material that I have prepared and necessarily left behind, as well as Woodbury's brigade, may at once be complied with. The enemy is strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the fulfillment of which I need all the aid the

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Government can give me. I again repeat the urgent request that Gen. Franklin and his division may be restored to my command.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

To this the President replied:

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN, Fortress Monroe : Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. The Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury'g brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of Gen. Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. LINCOLN.

In disregarding this pointed advice — from one who was entitled to command — a grave, though still not irretrievable, error of the campaign, was committed at the outset. Gen. Burnside had done at Newbern, on the 14th of the previous month, what was incomparably more difficult, in carrying the works of the enemy, when manned by numbers fully equal to his own. His forces, too, were largely made up of raw recruits. The Army of the Potomac, after eight months spent in its formation and discipline, was deemed by its commander inadequate to force its way through the line of fortifications at Yorktown, though so many times more numerous than the enemy. Ma-gruder gained the opportunity which he craved. Davis ordered Johnston and Beauregard to advance from Corinth, on the 3d of April, to crush the army of Grant at Pittsburg Landing— little dreaming then, as may well be supposed, that nearly three months would elapse before their presence would be indispensable at Richmond. The slow processes of a regular siege began in front of the little army of Magruder. Thousands sickened and died in the trenches. The nation grew weary of the same disheartening news, day by day, and week after week. Finally, the siege batteries were prepared to begin; and the enemy, though now strengthened by all the aid that thirty days could bring, was found to have deserted his

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works the moment an earnest attack was believed to be Imminent.

To the President's dispatch of April 6, Gen. McClellan tad little else to reply than by extravagant representations of the enemy's strength, with a corresponding disparagement of his own followed by complaining entreaties for reenforcements that could not be furnished. In this response, he also said: " Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest."

So persistent was McClellan in these complaints and demands that Mr. Lincoln felt constrained to address to him the following frank and kindly letter, plainly rehearsing the facts and reasons of the case, and again pointedly indicating the grand necessity of the hour:

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly r.ot without reluctance.

After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburgh, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio 'Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction: but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of

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course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops ? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be aceoumted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which , has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so. I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

Gen. McClellan, in the early part of that report, in which he has given his own rhetorical coloring to his operations, as a military commander, quotes, without contradiction or objection, the following statement of Mr. Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, showing that he had landed at Fortress Monroe, by the 6th dav of April, (having received the final order as early as

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the 28th of February), 121,500 men for McClellan, with a num- ber of wagons and animals manifestly well proportioned to these numbers :

In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington (and most of it was accomphshed in thirty days) these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandra, and Washington to Fort Monroe the place of departure having been changed, which caused delay) one hundred and twenty-one thousand five hundred men, fourteen thousand five hundred and ninety-two animals, one thousand one hundred and fifty wagons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambulances besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, etc., required for an army of such magnitude.

And yet McClellan telegraphed to the President on the 7th of April: "My entire force for duty only amounts to 85,000." Six days later, before receiving reinforcements, McClellan himself reported his force (as officially certified by Adj.-Gen. Thomas,) to be 117,721, of whom 100,970 were present for duty. In addition to this was the considerable force of Gen. Wool, on which he was authorized to draw at will. McDowell's command, also, so far as practicable, was put in a position for at once sustaining him and covering Washington.

To Gen. McClcllan's earnest appeal for Gen. Franklin's division, on the 1.0th of April, Secretary Stanton replied on the following day, granting this request. At the same date, McClellan telegraphed : " Nothing is left undone to enable us to attack with the least possible delay. * * There shall not be a moment's unnecessary delay in any of the operations here." On the 12th, he sends thanks for the promised reinforcements, and adds : "I am confident as to results now." On the 13th, he says : "Our work is progressing rapidly. We shall soon be at them, and I am sure of the result." On the 14th: "We are getting up the heavy guns, mortars and ammunition quite rapidly." To the President he telegraphed at the same date : " I have seen Gen. Franklin, and beg to thank you for your kindness and consideration. I now understand the matter, which I did not before."

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From day to day, his dispatches continued to hold out the expectation of almost immediate results, yet nothing of consequence occurred for many days, save an unfortunate skirmish at Lee's Mill, on the 16th, in which 35 were killed and 130 wounded, without any advantage gained. McClellan inquiring in regard to the position of McDowell, the President sent the following reply on the 21st: "Your dispatch of the 19th was received that day. Fredericksburg is evacuated and the bridge destroyed by the enemy, and a small part of McDowell's command occupies this side of the Rappahannock opposite the town. He purposes moving his whole force to that point." On the 23d, McClellan reported : " Recent rains have injured the roads and delayed us, but we are making progress all the time." On the 20th, a lanette (of the enemy's works) was carried, and on the 27th, the " first parallel essentially finished without accident," but the roads were " becoming horrid again."

The total number of McClellan's force, on the 30th of April, as officially given by Asst. Adj.-Gen. Townsend, was 130,378, of whom 112,392 are reported as "effective." This includes the division under Gen. Franklin, which had arrived several days before, but still remained on the transports.

A Nearly a month had now passed, in the manner indicated by the dispatches above quoted—fair samples of all—when there came a request for additional guns, which drew from the President the following response:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,

May 1,1862.

Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN: Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me—chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is any thing to be done ?

A. LINCOLN.

Two days later, on the night of May 3d, the enemy evacuated his works.

The siege of Yorktown, without a close investment, which was not attempted, if ever contemplated, could have no other than barren results, unless the retreating enemy were promptly pursued. For this, his movement was not soon enough dis-

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covered Here was, indeed, as the President had dreaded, "the story of Manassas repeated"—if that opinion may be hazarded in the face of Gen. McClellan's positive claim of a "brilliant success." His first announcement of the evacuation "was in the following dispatch :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

May 4, 9 A. M. To the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War : We have the ramparts. Have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. We hold the entire line of his works, which the engineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and horse-artillery in pursuit, supported by infantry. I move Franklin's division, and as much more as I can transport by water, up to West Point to-day. No time shall be lost. The gunboats have gone up York river. I omitted to state that Gloucester is also in our possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major General.

At 1 o'clock, on the same day, McClellan telegraphed a? follows:

Our cavalry and horse-artillery came up with the enemy's rear guard in their intrenchments about two miles this side of Williamsburg. A brisk fight ensued. Just as my aid left, Gen. Smith's division of infantry arrived on the ground, and I presume he carried his works, though I have not yet heard.

The enemy's rear is strong, but I have force enough up there to answer all purposes.

We have thus far seventy-one heavy guns, large amounts of tents, ammunition, etc. All along the lines their works prove to have been most formidable, and I am now fully satisfied of the correctness of the course I have pursued.

The success is brilliant, and you may rest assured its effects will be of the greatest importance. There shall be no delay in following up the enemy. The rebels have been guilty of the most murderous and barbarous conduct in placing torpedoes within the abandoned works, near Mill Springs, near the flag-staffs, magazines, telegraph-offices, in carpet-bags, barrels of flour, etc. Fortunately we have not lost many men in this manner. Some four or five have been killed and a dozen wounded. I shall make the prisoners remove them at their own peril.

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His dispatches of the next day are less joyous in their tone, It is "raining hard," and he pronounces the "roads infamous" and "horrible." An important engagement was fought this day, of which he had apparently gained imperfect knowledge when sending the following dispatch, late in the evening:

BIVOUAC IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG,

May 5, 1862, 10 o'clock P. M.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: After arranging for movements up York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find Gen. Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own.

Gen. Hancock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's Rebel brigade, by a real charge with the bayonet, taking one Colonel and a hundred and fifty other prisoners, and killing at least two Colonels and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme.

I do not know our exact loss, but fear that Gen. Hooker has lost considerably on our left.

I learn from the prisoners taken that the Rebels intend to dispute every step to Richmond.

1 shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I resume the original plan.

My entire force is undoubtedly inferior to that of the Rebels, who will fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

Gen. Stoneman had promptly moved his cavalry and horse-artillery, on receiving the order for pursuit, on the morning of the 4th. He first found the enemy within his works, two miles east of "Williamsburg, and being unsustained by infantry, was forced to retreat, with some loss, on being attacked by the guns of Fort Magruder. During the afternoon and night, the divisions of Gens. Smith and Hooker arrived on the ground—twelve or fourteen miles distant from Yorktown—as well as the corps commanders, Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes. No portion of General Sumner's force was yet present, but, as the senior offi cer, he assumed command, and ordered an attack on the Rebel works, in the evening, by Smith's division. Night, however, came on before the order could be executed. During the night, Sumner posted Hancock's brigade, of that division, in a strong

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position on the left Hooker's division, by order of Gen. Heintzelman, had taken position on the Lee s Mill road, coming near Fort Magruder quite early in the morning. At half past 7 o'clock, Hooker began an attack on the works in Ms front. The enemy gathered in superior force at this point, and the contest continued for hours, Gen. Heintzelman anxiously awaiting the appearance of Kearney's division, which he had sent for in the morning. A heavy rain had commenced the night before, which continued until the following morning, impeding the movement of troops, but not interrupting the determined purpose to carry the enemy's works. Hooker had suffered serious loss, his ammunition was giving out, and his troops were becoming exhausted, when at length, after 3 o'clock, Gen Kearney arrived with his men, and was ordered by Heintzelman at once to attack, which he did so vigorously as to drive the enemy back at all points, and to relieve Hooker, whose left flank was in imminent danger.

On the right, also, the enemy massed troops against Han-eock, who kept up a gallant fight to maintain his position, without the reeaforcement which Gen. Sumner was unwilling to hazard his center by sending him, until after the arrival of part of Couch's division, at 1 o'clock, which was followed by the remainder during the afternoon, and by Casey's division, so that the entire corps of Gen. Keyes was finally present, on the Tight and center. Hancock was on the point of being overwhelmed by greatly superior numbers, when the remainder of Smith's division, and Naglee's brigade from Hooker's division, were sent to his support, under the orders of McClellan, who arrived on the ground, as he states in his report, " between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile, Gen. Hancock, feigning to retreat slowly, drew out the enemy from their position, then turning suddenly, staggered them by volleys of musketry, and completed their rout by a brilliant bayonet charge, with a loss to the enemy of more than five hundred, his own loss being but thirty-one men.

The brunt of the battle had been sustained by the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, under Gen. Heintzelman. The former sustained the principal losses of the day, which were

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officially stated at 456 killed, 1,400 wounded, and 372 missing. This earnest and gallant battle, fought almost entirely without the knowledge of the commanding General, illustrates what was reasonably expected at the very outset at Yorktown. It seems hardly too much to say that it may have saved another month's siege at Williamsburg, where the position was perhaps even more favorable for defense than that at Yorktown, and where the enemy had a very much greater force than was originally at the latter place. As a result of this battle, the enemy retired from Williamsburg that night, and continued his retreat up the Peninsula. No immediate pursuit was attempted.

Gen. McClellan was exceedingly dissatisfied with Sunnier and the other corps commanders for venturing this engagement in his absence. In his first dispatch he notices only the movement of Hancock as a success. He names only Hooker besides, and him merely to refer to his losses. He afterward made some imperfect amends to Gen. Heintzelman and others, under remonstrance, but apparently with grudging reluctance, and even in his final report, after his resentment had ample time to cool, he stops short with the praise of Hancock, giving little credit to those who had done the chief work. On occupying Will-liamsburg, the next day he announced: " The victory Is complete," stating that the enemy lost heavily in killed.

The division under Gen. Franklin had been pushed forward by water to the right bank of the Paniunkey river, opposite West Point, and this movement was sustained by the divisions of Gens. Sedgwlck, Porter and Richardson, also transported in steamers. Franklin landed his troops on the morning of the 7th, and Dana's brigade (of Sedgwick's division) arrived soon after. These forces were attacked at 9 o'clock in the morning by a formidable Rebel force, and the battle lasted until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy was finally repulsed. Meanwhile, time had been gained for the main Rebel force to retreat unmolested, and with security to its trains. Franklin made a successful defense, only, instead of accomplishing any aggressive results. His total loss is'reported as 194, including a large proportion of officers.

Communication between Williamsburg and West Point was

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fully opened on the 10th "Movements were difficult and slow." In the mean time, Norfolk had been taken by Gen. Wool, and the Merrimac finally "neutralized." At this period, the President and Secretary of War—as well as the Secretary of the Treasury accompanied Gen. Wool in his advance on Norfolk—were on a visit at Fortress Monroe. It was while here that the Secretary of War received the following dispatch from Gen. McClellan, dated May 9 :

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: I respectfully ask"permission to reorganize the Army Corps. I am not will- ing to be held responsible for the present arrangement, expe riencc having proved it to be very bad, and it having nearly resulted in a most disastrous defeat. I wish rather to return to the organization by divisions, or else to be authorized to relieve incompetent commanders of Army Corps. Had I been one-half hour later on the field on the 5th, we would have been routed and would have lost every thing. Notwithstanding my positive orders, I was informed of nothing that had occurred, and I went to the field of battle myself upon unofficial information that my presence was needed to avoid defeat. I found there the utmost confusion and incompetency, the utmost discouragement on the part of the men. At least a thousand lives were really sacrificed by the organization into corps. I have "too much regard for the lives of my comrades, and too deep an interest in the success of our cause, to hesitate for a moment. I learn that you are equally in earnest, and I therefore again request full and complete authority to relieve from duty with this army, commanders of corps or divisions who find themselves incompetent.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General Commanding.

Secretary Stanton replied, in substance : The President directs rue to say that you " may temporarily suspend that organization in the army now under your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit until further orders. He also writes you privately." The President's letter, thus referred to, is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,

FORT MONROE, VA., May 9, 1862.

Maj.-Gren. MCCLELLAN—My Dear Sir: I have just assisted the Sceretary of War in framing the part of a dispatch to you

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relating to Army Corps, which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the Army Corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course, I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes — the commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you : but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication "with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but Gen. Fitz John Porter, and perhaps Gen. Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in any thing?

When you relieved Gen. Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return. Are you strong enough — are you strong enough even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman^and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause. Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Gen. McClellan did not conclude to make the changes which he had pronounced so indispensable. On the contrary, availing himself of the President's permission, he soon after created two new corps—the " Fifth Provisional Corps," formed of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, the former taken from the corps of Heintzelman, and the latter Regulars, to be commanded by Gen. Fitz John Porter; and the "Sixth Provisional Corps," consisting of Franklin's division, from McDowell's corps, and

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Smith's division, from Keyes' corps, to be commanded by Gen. W. B. Franklin.

The headquarters of the Army of the Potomac reached the White House on the 16th of May, and three days later with the corps of Franklin and Fitz John Porter, had advanced to Tunstall's Station, five miles nearer Richmond. Complaints of the roads and requests for reenforcements were not forgotten in the official dispatches of this period ; nor had the President schooled himself to perfect patience with the slow advance up the Peninsula, when he thought that not a moment's unnecessary delay should occur in "pushing the enemy to the wall." On the 14th, Gen. McClellan, being detained by bad roads, took occasion to send a long dispatch, representing his wants and opinions, to which the President, on the 15th, sent the following reply:

Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more fully soon; will say now that all your dispatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. I have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. I hoped that the opening of James river and putting Wool and Burnside in communication with an open road to Richmond or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still not willing to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here.

On the 20th of May, the advance reached the Chickahominy river, and found Bottom's Bridge, across that stream, as well as the railroad bridge, a mile above, destroyed by the enemy. The position was occupied, and the reconstruction of the bridges commenced. The river being fordable at this time, Casey's division was sent across the river and ordered to throw up defenses. Gen. Heintzelman's entire corps was also thrown across, in support. The center and right were advanced to the left bank of the river. On the 24th, the extreme right occupied Mcchanicsville, and one of the brigades (Naglee's) of Heintzelman's corps drove the enemy from the Seven Pines, on the Bottom's Bridge road, the left of the army advancing to that position. The distance from the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge to Richmond is about twice as great as the dis-

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tance to Richmond from the same stream at Mechanicsville. The entire line now extended from the latter point to Seven Pines, about half way from the river to Richmond, the Chick-ahominy flowing between the left and the right and center. This stream, here about forty feet in width, is subject to sudden variations in volume, heavy rains causing it to overflow the bottom-lands on each side, and rendering it impassable except by bridges—all of which, in this vicinity, had been destroyed by the enemy. The Meadow Bridge was north of Richmond, near the Virginia Central railroad, and a short distance above the bridge at Mechanicsville. The third, following down the stream six or seven miles, was called New Bridge, and was a less distance above the York river railroad bridge. Between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, McClel-lan determined to construct as many as eleven new bridges.

The Rebel line of defenses, within which the enemy had retired, commenced nearly opposite Drewry's Bluff, on the James river, and bending in a northeasterly direction, across the York river railroad, to the Chickahominy, very nearly followed up the right bank of that stream. The diameter of this semi-circular line was about seven miles, from the center at Richmond. The main body of the enemy, it appears, was encamped on the New Bridge road. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was still in command.

By instructions from the War Department, issued on the 17th of May, Gen. McDowell, to be reenforced by Shields' division, had been directed to establish a communication, as soon as possible, between his left and McClellan's right. Corresponding directions were sent to Gen. McClellan. A gunboat expedition up the James river had meanwhile been repulsed at Fort Darling, and the attempt to approach Richmond by that means had been effectually abandoned. On the 21st, McClellan telegraphed the following, with many other matters, to the President :

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my depart-

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ment. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second "article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your Excellency ; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I ana for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy can not advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas.

The President replied as follows, under date of May 22:

Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. You will have just such control of Gen. MeDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. MeDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at "Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting; whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. LINCOLN,

How the purpose above indicated came necessarily to be changed, will best appear from the two following dispatches :

MAY 24, 1862.

I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting Gen. Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the ene rny's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridge

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across the two forks of the Pamunkey and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from, receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and If you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN.

McClellan, in his report, erroneously gives a later dispatch (dated May 24) as the President's response on this occasion.

Intelligence received at a later hour on the same day, caused the President to suspend the order in regard to Gen. McDowell's movement, as the subjoined dispatch indicated to McClellan:

MAY 24, 1862.

In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in their rear.

A. LINCOLN.

To this, Gen. M.cClellan replied : " I will make my calculations accordingly."

The next dispatch clearly sets forth the situation of affairs at the time:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Your dispatch received. Gen. Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d, a Rebel force of seven to ten thousand fell upon one regi-ment and two companies guarding the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely ; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the load to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is

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broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with ten thousand troops, following tip and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force often thousand is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped, bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about twenty thousand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Port Royal; and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

Later, on the same day, the President sent the following :

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN : The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Banks before him—in precisely what force we can not tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south in precisely what force we can not tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. 1 think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN.

On the same day, McClellan replied: " Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to pre-

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vent reenforcements being sent to me..... I have two corps across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within the same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed."

Gen. Stoneman was sent out with a small cavalry force to cut the Virginia Central railroad between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court House. This is the eastern one of two lines of railroad from Richmond, both of which meet at Hanover Junction, several miles beyond the Court House. The other extends nearly due north from Richmond to Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. Both roads cross the South Anna river a few miles south of their junction, and at no great distance apart. To have destroyed both the South Anna bridges of these roads would have cut the enemy's direct communications with the forces in the Valley, and with those resisting McDowell's advance southward. In cutting only one of these roads, several miles south of the South Anna, very little was effected. The President anxiously telegraphed, on the 26th : " Can you not cut the Acquia Creek railroad also ? What impression have you as to the intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond ? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?" McClellan replied (on the same day) that he had " cut the Virginia Central railroad in three places, between Hanover Court House and the Chickahominy," and would "try to cut the other." To the other questions of the President, he replied: " I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable; but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chiekahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day." Later, he telegraphed as follows:

CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, May 26, 1862, 7.30 P. M.

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow

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are very Important, and if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

His Excellency, A. LINCOLN, President.

On the 27th, Fitz John Porter, with the Fifth Corps, was sent to disperse a Rebel force near Hanover Court Souse, ening the communications of our army, and in a position reenforce Jackson or to interfere with any southward movement of McDowell. This force was Branch's division, estimated to have been about nine thousand strong. Porter's corps, without needing the aid of Sykes' division of Regulars, sent to his support on the 28th, broke up the Rebel camp, and dispersed Branch's force. The result was thus announced by the Commanding General;

Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory : too much credit can not be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was complete;, not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in ; two companies have this moment arrived with excellent arms.

The President, after receiving this and other glowing dispatches on the subject, as well as repeated demands for reen-forcements on the ground that all the Rebel forces were concentrating at Richmond, sent the following :

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1862.

I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory ; still, if It was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy Is concentrating on Richmond, I think, can not be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. Gen. King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that fifteen thousand left Hanover June-

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tion Monday morning to reenforee Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

On the 29th, Gen. Marcy (chief of McClellan's staff) sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, Sixth Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna railroad bridge at about 9 A. M. to-day; a large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning.

The President replied:

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1862.

Your dispatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for their seizure.

A. LINCOLN. Gen.

R. B. MARCY.

The President had previously telegraphed to Gen. McDowell, on the 28th : " If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads, near Hanover Court House, consider whether your force in Fredericksburg should not push through and join him."

It is difficult to conceive any collateral operation which, at this juncture, could have had more positive results, than a thorough breaking of the enemy's communication with Jackson, by destroying the South Anna bridges and otherwise. After receiving the President's congratulations, however, on the supposed accomplishment of this object, the Commanding General telegraphed as follows — clearly implying that Porter's movement had really effected little in that direction, as the event proved:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OP THE POTOMAC,

May 30, 1862.

From the tone of your dispatches, and the President's, I do

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not think you all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the Eebel forces ; taken over seven hundred and fifty prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericksburg. I regard the burn-ing of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porter's movement.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

On the 29th, Mr. Lincoln had telegraphed : " I think we shall be able, within three days, to tell you certainly whether any considerable force of the enemy, Jackson or any one else, is moving on Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected development into your calculation." On the 31st, McClellan. said in a dispatch: "A contraband reports that Beauregard arrived in Richmond day before yesterday with troops, and amid great excitement..... Roads again frightful. Need more ambulances." At the same date, the President sent the following important information :

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little north-east of Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell and Edward Johnson ; quite certainly they were within it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening. Shields, with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 A. M. yesterday, with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, one hundred and fifty of the enemy, etc. . . Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Andersen's, having entered the Valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the hands of Gen. Halleek.

The Army of the Potomac, as officially reported on the 31st of May, numbered 127,166, of which force 98,008 were pres-

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ent for duty. To this was added the force of Gen. Wool, now put under Gen. McClellan's command, numbering 14,007 in the aggregate, 11,514 being "effective." Total, 141,173, with 109,522 present for duty. Gen. Sigel was also ordered to report, with his command, to Gen. McClellan; but the order was subsequently countermanded, and this force sent to Harper's Ferry. McCall's division was ordered to him on the 6th of June, and he received many other regiments from time to time.

An order of the War Department, June 1, extended the Department of Virginia to include that part of the State south of the Rappahannock and east of the railroad from Frede-ricksburg to Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon, under command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan. Gen. Wool was assigned to the command of the Middle Department, succeeding Gen. Butler, with directions to report to Gen. McClellan for orders.

Despite the diversion of a portion of his force for operations in the Valley, the Rebel General in command at Richmond now boldly assumed the aggressive against McClellan.

Taking advantage of a sudden rise of the Chickahominy, before the entire completion of the bridges, Johnston attacked our left in heavy force near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, on the 31st of May, having skillfully made his combinations with a view to cut off the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes. The attack commenced about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Casey's division, in the advance, was driven backward, after stoutly contesting the field for hours, while Heintzelman's two divisions were brought up in support. The enemy, attempting to force his way between these troops and Bottom's Bridge, was kept in check until about 6 o'clock. Gen. Sumner came up at that hour with Sedgwick's division, followed by Richardson's, having crossed on the imperfect bridge which they had constructed, and appeared suddenly on the left flank of Johnston's force, opening a destructive fire with his batteries, which stopped the enemy's advance. Then, by a gallant bayonet charge, led by Sumner in person, the Rebels were driven back with great slaughter, beyond Pair Oaks Station. What had been

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almost a crashing defeat, would have been turned into a brilliant victory, had our remaining troops been brought into action, and might probably have given us possession of Richmond.

This great opportunity escaped the Commanding General. As Prince de Joinville, his friend and volunteer aid during this campaign, informs us : "It was not until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross at daybreak to the right bank of the Ghickahominy, was entertained. It was now too late. Four hours had been lost, and the opportunity — that moment so fleeting, in war as in other circumstances — had gone."

The river rose rapidly during the night, sweeping away all the bridges. The enemy renewed the attack in the morning, knowing that our left and center were now completely isolated from the remainder of their comrades, the corps of Porter and Franklin. The troops of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes fought with desperate courage, sustaining themselves against the concentrated strength of the enemy, until nearly noon, when the latter retired, leaving his dead unburied, and many of his wounded on the field. Both sides had suffered severely in the battles of Saturday and Sunday. The Government loss is stated as about 5,000 and the Rebel loss about 8,000.

The situation of the Army of the Potomac was now full of interest—its opportunities clearly to be seen. The whole force which could be sent against it from Richmond had been beaten by one-half of this army. Jackson, with a foree estimated at 25,000, was now fighting with Banks, and Fremont and McDowell were endeavoring to close in about him. In relation to reported reinforcements to Johnston, McClellan telegraphed, on the 3d: "I am satisfied that Beauregard is not here." At the same time, he was fully aware that the forces of Beauregard and Bragg had evacuated Corinth on the 30th of May, and were now partly disposable for active service wherever they were most needed. Every day's delay was now an advantage to the enemy. To wait for reinforcements was to wait for his adversary to gather in every scattered regiment, and to hasten

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the arrival of Jackson and Beauregard. To pause for pleasant weather and good roads, was to postpone action indefinitely. He was already almost within shelling distance of Richmond. His supplies came with regularity by water to White House, and thence by railroad to his lines. And yet, with almost daily dispatches about rains and bad roads, with continual appeals for more men, which he knew could not be granted to any great extent, and with repeated assurances of what he was just going to do, nearly an entire month wore away, at this critical and most favorable juncture, without result.

On the 3d of June, he says : " The next leap will be the last one." The Government and the country expected it to be taken at once. But on the 5th, comes an argument for more troops. Five new regiments, and McCall's division, from McDowell's command, are promptly granted him. On the 8th, he says: " I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the same day, McDowell informs him: " For the third time I am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get through." Having thus the long-sought forces of McDowell apparently within his grasp, he improves the occasion to call for more, telegraphing as follows, on the 11th: "I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him." He asks, therefore, that reinforcements may be sent him from Halleck's army. He laments that he is the victim of an "abnormal season," and adds: " I am completely checked by the weather." At the same date (despite the weather) he reports that " McCall's troops have commenced arriving."

On the 12th, he reports: " Another good day. All quiet this morning. I move headquarters to-day across the river." On the 14th: " I hope two days more will make the ground practicable." On the 15th: "Another rain set in about 3 P. M. to-day." On the 18th he thinks reinforcements for Jackson* had gone from Richmond. Mr. Lincoln replies, stating

* The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, in which Gen. Fre-mont failed to arrest the retreat of Stonewall Jaekson, had been fought on the 8th and 9th of June.

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circumstances by which this opinion is "corroborated," adding : " If this is true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things, if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond." McClellan replies, the same day: " A general engagement may take place any hour..... We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

On the 19th, the President suggests that the reported re-en forcernent of Jackson may be a mere ruse. McClellan repliess on the 20th : " I have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here. There is reason to believe that Gen. R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army,* with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro. There is not the slightest reason to suppose the enemy intends evacuating Richmond. He is daily increasing his defenses. .... I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the mean time, I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere."

To this singular dispatch, the President sent the following reply:

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M.

Your dispatch of yesterday, 2 P. M., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can not, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances

*Gen. Robert E. Lee had been assigned to the command of the Rebel forces at Richmond, on the 3d of June, superseding Johnston, who had been wounded at Fair Oaks.

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of Its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you can not leave your camp, and I can not well leave here.

A. LINCOLN, President.

Maj.-Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

In his final report, Gen. McClellan makes the following statement: "All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville. where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and Staunton; but what his purposes were, did not appear until the date specified," etc. Entertaining this opinion, it may well be asked, in passing, how happened it that he so vehemently urged, again and again, the withdrawal of all troops from before Washington, leaving an entirely inadequate garrison within the city itself, in order to transfer all to the Peninsula? Such, on the one hand, is his confession; such, on the other, was his demand. That Jackson was prepared for any " purpose " that best suited the occasion — that he would have attacked Washington had McDowell's army been withdrawn, as McClellan desired, or that he would have invaded Maryland by way of the Valley, as Lee has since done—can admit of no rational doubt. Both those movements were defeated by the wise forecast of the President, and by his persistence in adhering to the policy so clearly marked out, with the approval of all the leading generals, at the outset of the Peninsular movement. When McClellan admits his inability to discern the intentions of Jackson, more than a month after the latter left Richmond, he at once puts at rest all cavils in regard to the opinions of those who assumed some other purpose possible than that finally developed. But what solution can be given of his own inaction during all this period of Jackson's known absence? And how will he even give a plausible look to his eagerness to withdraw McDowell, and to leave to Jackson an unobstructed route to the National Capital?

But the " purposes " of Jackson, hitherto so uncertain, were discovered on the 24th of June, and thus reported:

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAO,

June 24, 1862, 12 P. M.

A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell, (fifteen brigades,) at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General.

The reply was as follows :

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1862.

We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand Eebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Eepublic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelley, that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says, the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.

A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purported to be dated at Gordonsville on the 14th instant, stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement is now toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not

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safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

On the 25th, McClellan began to advance his left, preparatory, he says, to a general forward movement. In the evening of the same day, he reported : " The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition." An hour and a half earlier, he had telegraphed : "On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front."

The blow which the wily deserter had announced to be struck by Jackson on the 28th, fell two days earlier. Only an hour after announcing the success of his preliminary movement on the 25th, McClellan reported that he had "information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reenforcements, in Richmond yesterday." The desponding side of his temper, and an impulse to protect himself from the extreme effects of an apprehended fall, appear in the following paragraph of this dispatch :

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders ; it must rest where it belongs.

Secretary Stanton replied :

WASHINGTON, June 25,1862, 11.20 P. M. Your telegram of fifteen minutes past 6 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more reenforce-ments than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President, that it is needless for me to repeat them.

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Every effort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth; Shield's division and Ricketts' division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCLELLAN.

The President sent the following dispatch on the same subject:

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN : Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The later one, of 6.15 P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that 1 could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reenforcements whenever I possibly can.

A. LINCOLN.

P. S. Gen. Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better toward York river than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the Capitol, please confer with him through the telegraph.

A. LINCOLN.

The aggregate number of the Army of the Potomac, on the 20th of June, was 156,838. The campaign had now extended into the season when disease could not fail to be prevalent, in the low, swampy region now occupied by the Government troops. The effective men numbered 115,102.

From the evening of the 26th, when Jackson attacked his right, and threatened his communications by the Pamunkey river, Gen. McClellan states that " every energy of the army was bent" to the end of "an immediate change of base across the Peninsula." The Rebel Gen. D. H. Hill had gone out from Richmond with his command that day, over Meadow Bridge, to form a junction with Jackson, who was approaching by way of Ashland and Hanover Court House. At about 3 o'clock P. M., Hill attacked McCall, at Mechanicsville, and

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was finally repulsed, with great loss. Gen. MeClellan telegraphed: " Victory to-day complete, and against great odds. I almost begin to think we are invincible." During the night, the baggage of the Fifth Corps (Porter's) was sent across to the west side of the Chickahominy, and preparations were made to start the trains next day, for James river. Orders were at the same time sent to the White House for the removal of all the stores possible from that vicinity, by water, up the James river, to meet the retreating army, and to destroy whatever supplies could not be thus reshipped. These orders were promptly executed. Gen. Stonernan, with his cavalry force, having been cut off, made a successful retreat to the "White House.

McCall was to fall back and unite with the rest of Porter's corps, on the east bank of the Chickahominy, to hold the bridges at Gaines' Mill, giving time for the main army to execute its intended movement. This position was to have been maintained until the night of the 27th, when Porter's force was to cross, destroying the bridges. Hill, however, attacked McCall at dawn with great vigor, compelling him to retire further down the stream, leaving the bridge at Mechanicsville to the enemy. A large part of the Rebel force was now on the left bank of the river, and expeditiously concentrated for the destruction of Porter's forces at Gaines' Mill, near the New Bridge. Porter's left at length gave way, under the fierce and overwhelming onset of the enemy, and the center was thrown into confusion, with imminent danger of utter rout. Reen-forcements were hurried across from the south bank of the river, and saved the day. Meagher's Irish brigade, fighting with unsurpassed gallantry, and French's brigade, with like heroic conduct, came to the support of Porter's broken divisions, and held the enemy in check until night closed the conflict. This battle was one of the most sanguinary of the campaign, resulting in defeat, but it gained time for starting the trains and troops through White Oak Swamp. It had also drawn out Lee's forces from Richmond, so as to prevent any immediate interference with the retreat from that quarter.

It was not until the 28th, that Lee became fully aware of

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the purpose of McClellan to withdraw his army to the James river. The single road by which this movement was to be made was exposed, at different points, to an advance of the enemy from Richmond, by the several roads leading from the city. There was no degree of security until the rear had passed through the Swamp, and on emerging therefrom the danger would be soon renewed. The corps of Sumner and Franklin were stationed at Fair Oaks on Sunday, the 29th, (Heintzelman meanwhile retiring,) and having protected the trains, which were now well on their way, (a large amount of property which could not be transferred having been destroyed,) began to fall back. The enemy, perceiving the movement, promptly attacked the retiring forces, about 2 o'clock P. M., and they made a stand not far from Savage's Station. The Rebel masses, brought up within a short distance of our artillery, now in position, were repulsed with great loss, and their repeated attacks were successfully repelled. During the night, Sumner and Franklin fell back to the White Oak Swamp bridge. On the morning of the 30th, the last of the troops had followed the trains across that bridge. Franklin remained to dispute the passage of the Rebels at this point, while Heintzelman, with the four divisions of Hooker, Sedgwick, Kearney and McCall, took position at Charles City Cross Roads, where several roads leading from Richmond intersect. Jackson's corps crossed the Chickahominy early on Monday morning, following up the retreating army by the Williamsburg road. The forces of Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Magruder and Huger went out the Charles City road with the expectation of intercepting our forces at that point. Jackson had come close upon the position held by Franklin at the White Oak Swamp, a little before noon; but the rear of our army had already crossed and destroyed the bridge. An artillery engagement followed, lasting until night, with severe losses on both sides. Two brigades of Sumner's corps participated in this action. Further pursuit from this direction was not attempted.

Toward night, on the same day, the forces of Longstreet and others (commanded by Gen. A. P. Hill, the former being absent,) attacked the force under Heintzelman, who was aided

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by part of Sumner's corps. The enemy was repulsed with great slaughter and thrown into confusion. In vain were fresh troops massed against the well-managed batteries and heavy musketry fire of our forces. After a desperate conflict, in which the fate of the whole Army of the Potomac was at stake, and with all the strength the Rebels could bring upon the field, a decisive victory was gained for the Government. This lias been called the battle of Grnlendale.

The corps of Keyes and Porter had meanwhile moved forward, in advance of the remaining troops, toward James river, near Turkey Bend, to open communication with the gunboats. The rear of the trains had reached Malvern Hill while the action at Glendale was going on. The transports from the White House arrived almost simultaneously. During the night, the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin fell back to the vicinity of this point. Here was an elevated open table-land, a mile and a half in length by three-fourths of a mile in breadth, crossed by several intersecting roads. The troops were massed on this hill for a final encounter, most of the artillery being placed in position—including ten siege guns at the very summit. Porter's corps held the left, Heintzelman and Sumner the center, and Keyes the right, the line curving backward nearly to the river. The left flank was protected by the gunboats under command of Com. Rodgers, which took part in the action, and on the right the roads were barricaded.

Thus disposed, after the losses incurred during a wearisome retreat of seventeen miles, fighting by day and marching by night, the Army of the Potomac was compelled to grapple with the collected forces of the enemy. Before 1.0 o'clock in the morning, Rebel skirmishers, with artillery, appeared all along the left wing. About 2 o'clock a column was seen in front of Heintzelman, beyond the range of his artillery, moving toward the right, but it disappeared without making an attack. An hour later, the divisions of Kearney and Couch, on the left center, were fiercely assailed with artillery and musketry. The fire was returned with such effect as to drive back the assailants in disorder, our forces advancing several hundred yards to a stronger position. This

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action occupied about an hour. The enemy renewed the attack on the left about six o'clock, with artillery, advancing his infantry columns to storm the hill. These were swept away by our batteries, and each successive attacking party shared the same fate, until the field was covered with the wounded and dead. Not only artillery fire, but also volleys of musketry and bayonet charges, met the persistent assailants, who advanced, column after column, only to be crushed and scattered. Night ended the terrible struggle—the Stars and Stripes floating in grand triumph over the field made ghastly with the Rebel masses, fallen in the vain attempt to overwhelm a gallant army that six days before had seemed their easy prey.

Instead of improving the advantage gained, to drive into Richmond an enemy whose strength, as now shown by repeated trials, had been greatly overrated, and who was disheartened by continued defeat, the commanding General withdrew his forces from their strong position, retiring to Harrison's Landing. This was effected during the next two days, with no serious attempt at molestation from the enemy. Gen. McClellan states the entire number of his killed, wounded and missing during these seven days, at 15,249.

Thus ended the Peninsular campaign—adding three disastrous months of unmasterly activity to the eight months of dreamy indecision before Washington. It was no fault of the army. It was from no lack of support by the Government. It was due to no combination of untoward events. The positive successes at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at Savage's Station, at Glendale, and at Malvern Hill, show that the Army of the Potomae could win victories, even against great supposed odds in numbers and in position, when courageously led to the fight.

In adopting a route to Richmond by the Lower Chesapeake, against the better judgment of the President, Gen. McClellan had expressed his readiness to stake his reputation, his life, and the cause itself, on the success of his plan. He was furnished all needful means, and every available man, consistently with his own opinions as to the necessary security of Washing-

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ton, and with the express conditions agreed to by himself in undertaking the work. He sadly failed in his efforts to employ those men and means to the accomplishment of the end desired.

The military record of the campaign has a singular sameness. When occasionally his roads are good, he can not move without reinforcements. When his reinforcements come, he has to wait for better roads. Thus time passes—the month of April, before an army originally one-eighth as large as his own; much of May and June by the sickly Chickahominy, his men not unfit for duty engaged in throwing up intrenchments, to be abandoned on the first attack. Day after day, he is only waiting for something just on the point of being gained, when his final advance and assault are to commence. But perfect readiness never comes ; and at last, the enemy, concentrating all his strength, himself attacks, and puts upon its defense, an army that was confidently led forth for aggressive war.

A month wasted at Yorktown, without plausible palliation; tardy pursuit, after the unintended battle, resulting in victory at Williamsburg; unaccountable hesitation and slackness on the Chickahominy ; utter neglect to use the known absence of Jackson, or to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard after the evacuation of Corinth; insured an otherwise impossible discomfiture. Never did the result of a campaign more bitterly disappoint public hope. The worst that Mr. Lincoln had foreseen from the adoption of the Peninsular plan had happened, and even a loss of the entire army was now dreaded. Every advantage supposed by Gen. McClellan to be attainable by this route to Richmond had been thrown away. The cause had suffered a vastly greater blow than at Bull Run. The nation was more depressed; the Administration more painfully embarrassed, than by any previous calamity. The worst effects upon the cause, abroad and at home, were to be apprehended from this unfortunate issue of a grand military plan.